This paper studies the relationships between the traditional Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol and the identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol from pairings.
Introduction
In 2005, Boyd and Choo [7] and Wang et al. [35] noticed that there are some similarities between (pairing-based) ID-based and non-ID-based authenticated key agreement (AK) protocols. This study further investigate this observation. Interestingly, we discover much more than those researchers previously might imagined. Enhanced MTI/C1 (See Fig. 19 ) ⇔ Open Problem! Fig. 18 ) ⇔ SYL [40] C0 Variant-1 T A = xQ B K = (x + y + xy)P ⇔ Xie [39] Repaired Protocol K = (x + y)P ||xyP ⇔ LYL [19] 2 Preliminaries
Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 denotes an additive group of prime order q and G 2 a multiplicative group of the same order. We let P denote a generator of G 1 . For us, an admissible pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
1. The map e is bilinear: given Q, R ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q , we have e(aQ, bR) = e(Q, R) ab .
2.
The map e is non-degenerate: e(P, P ) = 1 G2 .
3. The map e is efficiently computable.
Typically, the map e will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
Three Versions of the SOK Protocol and the Substitution Rules
We first focus on the SOK ID-based key setting [32] . We show that the static SOK protocol from [32] has two more variants, i.e., the semi-static and ephemeral SOK protocols. Note that the figures given in the rest of the paper are all self-explaining.
Static DH and the SOK-NIKD Protocols
As observed by Boyd, Mao and Paterson [4] and Ryu et al. [25] , the two non-interactively shared static secret from the Diffie-Hellman protocol [12] and the SOK non-interactive ID-based key distribution (SOK-NIKD) protocol [32] are F DH = abP and F SOK = e(Q A , Q B ) s , respectively.
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Semi-Static and Ephemeral SOK Protocols

The Semi-Static SOK Protocol
It is well-known that the ElGamal encryption scheme [13] is derived from the semi-static (or halfstatic, half-ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman protocol [22] . Based on this seemingly obvious relation, we find that the Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption (IBE) [3, 27] is derived from the semi-static SOK protocol (presented in Fig. 3 ). Note that Paterson and Srinivasan [24] also, independently, noticed the relation. However, they do not give the term "semi-static SOK protocol" explicitly (let alone the ephemeral SOK) and only uses the static SOK protocol, i.e. the SOK-NIKD protocol. We stress that the explicit classification of the SOK protocol, corresponding to the three version of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, is essential for the main result of this paper. In the rest of the paper, P 0 stands for the public key of the private key generator (PKG), with P 0 = sP and s being the master private key of the PKG.
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The Semi-Static SOK Protocol
The Ephemeral SOK Protocol
The protocol is presented in Fig. 4 .
Alice Bob
(Alice has no static keys.) (Bob has no static keys either.) 
The UM and the RYY Protocols
The RYY protocol [25] is build upon the UM protocol [1, 15] 1 . The two session secrets of the two protocols are K = F DH ||xyP and K = F SOK ||xyP , respectively. A common weakness of them is that they do not possess K-CI resilience [7, 35] .
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The MTI/A0 and the Smart Protocols
For those who are unfamiliar with the MTI protocol family, we refer to [22, 9, 8] . The same design idea that produces the MTI/A0 and the Smart protocols was previously noticed, e.g. in [36] , the authors used the term "Encrypt-Decrypt method". Concretely, the MTI/A0 protocol is based on the standard ElGamal encryption, while Smart's protocol [31] is based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE [3] . However, the relations between the computation of the two session secrets (c.f. the following observation No. 2) has not yet been identified before. The two session secrets of the two protocols are K = aT B + xQ B and K = e(S A , T B )e(sP, xQ B ), respectively. A common weakness of the two protocol is that they do not have perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
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From our first observation, aT B should be changed to e(S A , T B ). Here we further notice that xQ B is changed to e(sP, xQ B ), with the help of the master public-key P 0 (P 0 = sP ) 2 . Therefore, we get our second observation. Here Q i (i = {1, 2}) are any publicly computable elements in group G 1 , such as Q A + Q B , Q A + T B , with Q A , Q B being public keys and T B being the protocol message sent out by Bob.
Important observation #2: aQ 1 + xQ 2 −→ e(S A , Q 1 )e(P 0 , xQ 2 ).
We summarize the above two observations with the following two substitution rules in Table 3 .
2 In [34] , it was shown that under the SOK key setting, IBE also exists if the master public-key of the PKG is set to be P 0 = s −1 P . We stress that this is also true with ID-based key agreement protocols, namely setting P 0 = s −1 P will not affect the correctness and security of the A0 type ID-based protocols (e.g., Smart's, the SYL and our proposed ID-MQV), all that needed is to replace the protocol message T A = xP with T A = xP 0 , and then adjust the computation of the session secrets accordingly. Publicly-computable group element:
Relations between Pairs of Existing Protocols
Applying the above two important substitution rules, we discover some unpublished relations between some pairs of existing protocols.
The MTI/A1 and the Chen-Kudla Protocols
The Chen-Kudla protocol [11] can be obtained by directly applying the above two substitution rules. In MTI/A1, the session secret is K = aT B + axQ B . Therefore in its ID-based counterpart, the session secret is K = e(S A , T B )e(S A , xQ B ) = e(S A , T B + xQ B ). This is exactly the Chen-Kudla [11] protocol! Alice Bob long-term private/public key pair:
The MQV-1 and Wang's Protocols
Wang's protocol [33] can be obtained from the so-called MQV-1 protocol by directly applying the above two rules. We first review the famous MQV [18] protocol. Note that the HMQV protocol [17] is a hashed variant of the MQV protocol.
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long-term private/public key pair: The MQV-1 protocol can be obtained by simply changing the protocol message T A = xP to be T A = xQ A , and then adjust the protocol accordingly. The session secret of the MQV-1 protocol is K = (x + h A )a(T B + h B Q B ). Therefore in its ID-based counterpart, the session secret is K = e((x+h A )S A , T B +h B Q B ), this is exactly the Chow-Choo protocol [10] -a hashed variant of Wang's protocol [33] .
Obtaining the Real ID-Based MQV Protocol
Our ID-MQV Protocol
The session secret in (H)MQV is as follows:
We let
Applying Rule #2, we obtain the ID-based version of this protocol -ID-MQV, its session secret K is as follows:
Figure 12: ID-MQV: ID-Based (H)MQV Protocol
If we wipe off h A and h B , then the above ID-MQV protocol degenerate into the Shim protocol [28] which is given in Fig 13. However, the Shim protocols is totally broken by Sun and Hsie [29] . In 2005, Yuan and Li [40] repaired the Shim protocol using a very simple idea, namely just adding an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman value. The improved protocol is called the Shim-Yuan-Li (SYL) protocol (see Fig. 17 ) and was proven to be secure by Chen et al. [5] . In Fig. 18 , we present the non-ID-based version of the SYL protocol -nID-SYL.
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Remarks on the ID-MQV Protocol
long-term private/public key pair: Our ID-MQV protocol has remarkable superiorities over all the existing ID-based key agreement protocols (from pairings).
1. From the format of the protocol messages, we argue that our ID-MQV is the real ID-based version of the famous (H)MQV protocol. As mentioned above, the Chow-Choo and Wang protocols are ID-based version of the so-called (H)MQV-1 protocols, which have different protocol messages.
2. Separating perfect forward secrecy (PFS) from PKG forward secrecy (PKG-FS). Note that PKG-FS also means escrowless. We argue that in some applications (as also pointed out by McCullagh and Barreto [20] ) key escrow is a requirement or even, a must. However, if we remove K 1 = abP from the SYL protocol [40] to open escrow, then it become totally insecure (which is exactly Shim's protocol [28] ), let alone PFS. Our new protocol can be securely used in escrowed model (i.e., w/o xyP ), providing PFS. When xyP is added, the protocol becomes escrowless (and achieves PKG-FS, see Fig. 14) . In a word, xyP separates clearly PFS from PKG-FS, and our new protocol (ID-MQV) can be used with or without escrow.
3. Compared with Wang's protocol [33] (and the Chow-Choo protocol [10] ), our protocol does not need extra message exchange to close escrow, while the latter requires a party to send out an extra point. At the same time, brings extra computation for the party.
4. The new protocol can be further strengthened to achieve stronger security, i.e., to be secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model which allows ephemeral secret key reveal. (Using the same idea from [6] .)
Beyond the SOK ID-Based Key Construction
Now we look at the SK key setting. For details on the key setting, please refer to [30] and [20, 38] .
Here we note that the master private and public key pair of the PKG is s, P 0 = sP . u is part of a user's static public key and for Alice u A = H ′ (ID A ) ∈ Z * q . We discover that the key transport protocol behind the SK-IBE [30] is simply the ID-based version of the Hughes protocol [16] . This is mainly because the static private key of the receivers in the two protocols are both inversion-based. The substitution rules are listed in Table 4 . 
Ephemeral Private-key: x Publicly-computable element: Q Publicly-computable element: Q
Using the above rules, we can establish the relations between the MB protocols [20, 21] and the MTI/C0 and MTI/B0 [23] protocols (c.f. Table 1), the details are omitted here. Next, based on the enhanced MTI/C0 protocol (i.e. the ECKE-1N protocol), we propose a highly efficient ID-based protocol -eMB.
Review of the ECKE-1N Protocol
This protocol was initially designed using the ideas from MQV. It was later included in a Letter appeared in IEEE Communications Letters entitled "Cryptanalysis and Improvement of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol" [37] . (Also available at IACR ePrint, report 2007/026.) The protocol is give in Fig. 15 .
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The eMB Protocol
Applying the substitution rules from Table 4 , we converse our ECKE-1N into an ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol which is the enhanced version of the McCullagh-Barreto protocol [20, 21] -eMB.
h A = H(Q B , T A ) K = e((x + h A )S A , T B + h B Q A ) K = e((y + h B )S B , T A + h A Q B ) = e(P, P ) (x+hA)(y+hB ) = e(P, P ) We remark that the substitution rules in the SK ID-based key setting can also be applied to the SK variants, e.g. Gentry's key setting [14] and the second Boneh-Boyen (BB 2 ) scheme [2] . 
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B Enhanced MTI/C1 Protocol
This protocol can be easily derived from our enhanced MTI/C0 protocol (i.e. the ECKE-1N protocol) using the idea from [23] . 
